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MICHELMAN AS DOCTRINALIST

Gregory S. Alexander*

Frank Michelman, the theorist, is a figure known to judges and legal scholars
literally around the world. Michelman' s wildly successfully 1967 HarvardLawReview
article, Property, Utility,and Fairness,invented the economic model of takings that
is now the starting point for every economic analysis of the takings issue.' The same
article is simultaneously the origin of a mode of analyzing takings disputes based
upon a Rawlsian theory of fairness.2 I can think of no other legal topic in which
virtually the entire theoretical landscape was not simply described, but created by, a
single piece of scholarship.
Michelman's subsequent writings on takings, such as, to pick only three examples,
the magnificent 1987 Iowa Law Review article, Possession vs. Distributionin the
ConstitutionalIdea ofProperty;3 his keynote article in the 1988 Columbia Law Review
symposium;4 and his 1993 William & MaryLaw Review comment on Lucas,5 are similar examples of high legal theory at its very best. To put it as directly as I can, no one
does theory better than Frank Michelman.
But I want to praise a different Michelman as well: Michelman the doctrinalist.
With Michelman's dominance as a theorist of takings law as dominant as it is, it is easy
to overlook or underplay his contribution to takings law strictly at the level of doctrinal and case analysis. At this level as well, Michelman has no rival.
Let's go back to the Property, Utility, andFairnessarticle. In this sprawling, complex, magisterial work (I sometimes think of it as takings law's counterpart to Mahler' s
Symphony ofa Thousand), Michelman's powers as a doctrinal analyst are in full display. Two contributions are especially notable. The first is his account and critique of
* A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell University. I am grateful to Professor Eric
Kades for inviting me to the conference honoring Frank Michelman, whose work has inspired
me for many years and whose friendship I treasure.
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "JustCompensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967) [hereinafter Michelman,
Ethical Foundations].
2 Id. at 1219-24.
3 Frank I. Michelman, Possessionvs. Distributionin the ConstitutionalIdea of Prop-

erty, 72 IOWA L. REv. 1319 (1987).

Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987,88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman, Takings].
4

5 Frank I. Michelman, Property,Federalism,andJurisprudence:A Comment on Lucas
and JudicialConservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301 (1993) (discussing Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
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the permanent physical occupation test, commonly associated with the 1982 Loretto
decision. 7 Michelman anticipated not only Loretto's categorical approach but facts
similar to Loretto itself.8 He pointed out that "courts, while they sometimes do hold
nontrespassory injuries compensable, never deny compensation for a physical takeover." 9 He went on to say that

[t]he one incontestable case for compensation (short of formal expropriation) seems to occur when the government deliberately brings it about that
its agents, or the public at large, "regularly" use, or "permanently" occupy,
space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be under private ownership. This may be true although the invasion is practically trifling from
the owner's point of view. 0
Michelman identified the two flaws with this rule of decision that are well-known
today: the fortuitousnessof the permanent physical occupation factor and its elevation of purely nominal harms to the level of a constitutional violation. " Both of
these factors figured prominently in the withering criticisms that commentators leveled
at Loretto.'2 In rejecting Justice Marshall's seeming elevation of form over substance,
these critics were only restating points that Michelman had already made abundantly clear.' 3
The second doctrinal contribution of that article that I want to single out here concerns another familiarjudicial test, the Hadacheck14 doctrine. As we all know, that
doctrine provides that government actions that prevent or abate public harms are noncompensable, even when that action inflicts very substantial losses on private owners.'
The problem in this test is now familiar to all takings mavens: a government landuse restriction that is sustained on the ground that it prevents a public harm can just
as easily be characterized as one that extracts a benefit for the public, an action that
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
Michelman, Ethical Foundations,supra note 1, at 1184-90, 1226-29.
' Compareid. at 1185 (discussing installation of subterranean utility lines), with Loretto,
458 U.S. at 422 (finding the installation of television cables on the roof and side of a building
constituted a taking).
9 Michelman, Ethical Foundations,supra note 1, at 1184.
'0Id. at 1184-85.
" Id. at 1226-27.
2 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, CompensationforTakings:An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 569, 613-14 (1984); John J. Constonis, Presumptive and
PerSe Takings: A DecisionalModel for the Takings Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465, 505-09
(1983); Elizabeth G. Patterson, PropertyRights in the Balance-The BurgerCourt and ConstitutionalProperty,43 MD. L. REv. 518, 566-68 (1984).
13 Michelman, Ethical Foundations,supra note 1, at 1185.
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
'5 Id. at 410-11.
6

7
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presumably requires compensation. Whether the government is more aptly characterized as harm-preventing than benefit-conferring requires a neutral benchmark.
Is a regulation forbidding roadside billboards, Michelman asked, one that prevents
the harms of roadside blight and distraction or one that secures the public benefits of
safety and amenity? 6 As Michelman put it, this test "will not work unless we can establish a benchmark of 'neutral' conduct which enables us to say where refusal to
confer benefits... slips over into readiness to inflict harms."'1 Joe Sax had recognized the problem and recast it in terms of his "enterprise/arbitration" approach. 8
Michelman showed that this approach is subject to the same basic challenge:
why should it be thought less odious for society to force a landowner to
contribute without compensation to the welfare of his neighbors (those
who suffer from his nuisance-like activities) than to the welfare of all of us
(who suffer from his refusal to dedicate his land to public uses)? 9
But Michelman did not throw the baby out with the bath. He recognized that
there is a stubborn intuitive appeal to the distinction, and he dug deeper, much deeper
than anyone else had or has since, to see if the harm-prevention/benefit-conferring
distinction, which so many courts seemed to find sensible, indeed does usefully serve
some other analytical purpose. 20 His answer, of course, was yes: 21 "The true office
of the harm-prevention/benefit-extraction dichotomy is... to help us decide whether
a potential occasion of compensation exists at all. '22 The distinction does not help
us decide what efficiency and fairness require by way of compensation, but it does
help us recognize situations that do not raise any compensation issue at all because
the social action in question is one that merely corrects some prior theft-like redistribution or deliberate redistributive gamble, rather than collectively pursuing an
efficient use of resources. 23 The intuitive appeal of the distinction, Michelman saw,
was that activities restricted by harm-preventing measures are usually of the theft
or gamble-like variety, which are a matter of corrective justice or other non-efficiency
reason; whereas activities restricted by public-benefit-conferring measures typically
are efficiency-based, raising the compensation question.24
Now, characteristically, Michelman took pains to caution against drawing any sharp
distinction between these two types of measures.2' You should not always assume that
16

Michelman, EthicalFoundations,supra note 1, at 1197.

17

Id.

" Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62-64 (1964).
'9 Michelman, EthicalFoundations,supra note 1, at 1201.
20 Id. at 1235.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1239.
23

Id.

24

See id.
Id. at 1236-37.

25
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no legitimate compensation issue is raised by a regulation that is ostensibly nuisanceabating or that a legitimate compensation question is always posed by a measure
that seems to be a restriction on innocent activity for efficiency's sake.26 The distinctive
should not be determinative, but it should be considered in deciding whether there
is a compensation question at all.27 Once again, Michelman's strong instinct for standards and against categorical rules is in full view. Once again, Michelman rigorously
explains how a conventional takings doctrine, properly understood, operates in a rational
and fair way.28
Fast-forward to 1988. Michelman's lead contribution to the Columbia symposium,
The JurisprudenceofTakings, dissected four major and well-known Supreme Court
takings cases from the 1986-87 Term.29 His aim, as he put it, was to "give a cogent
account of the[] decisions," rather than to "grandly theorize either them or the constitutional texts they construe."3 Specifically, he set out to see if the cases fit within an
existing pattern of regulatory takings cases and to explain that pattern.3
The result was illuminating, to say the least. The pattern that Michelman saw was
a reaction against the failure, over sixty-five years, for the Court's informal openended balancing approach to consistently yield victories for the claimant.32 The Court
was, as he put it, "moving noticeably towards a reformalization of regulatory-takings
doctrine."33 But it was not some crude version of legal formality that Michelman
saw.34 What he saw in the four cases was a much subtler and more limited variety
of formalism.35 He gave Nollan,36 for example, a narrow reading that, as he put it,
"fully explain[ed] the opinion and its result without, implausibly, turning Nollan into
Lochner redivivus."37 It has since become clear that Nollan, even extended by its subsequent partner, Dolan,3" was mostly certainly not "Lochner redivivus." What nettled
the Court in both cases was the coerced sacrifice of the owner's right to exclude the
public, a fact that, as Michelman pointed out with respect to Nollan, put the cases in
the vicinity of Loretto, with its per se takings rule.39 Michelman's rendering of the
26

Id. at 1237-38.

217Id. at 1238-39.
28 See id. at 1241.
29 See Michelman, Takings, supra note 4.

30Id. at 1601.
31 id.
32 Id. at 1621-22. During this period, only two cases were decided in favor of claimants.
Id. at 1621 n.105.
33Id. at 1622.
3 See id.
35 Id.
36

Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).

37 Michelman,

Takings, supra note 4, at 1609 (contrasting Nollan with Lochner v. New

York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
38 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
39 Michelman, Takings, supra note 4, at 1608.
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limited impact of Nollan seems to have been confirmed in subsequent decisional law,
even taking Dolan into account.
Similarly, Michelman read FirstEnglish4° in a way that made the regulation's indefinite duration, the key to the case.4 ' He rejected a broader reading (like Justice
Stevens did) that would have made the case a broad endorsement of the principle of
' Here
"conceptual severance by time shares."42
again, subsequent developments have
borne out the perspicacity of Michelman' s narrow reading, for it squares nicely with
43 In fact, at the end of his discussion of First
Justice Stevens's analysis in Tahoe-Sierra.
English, Michelman posed a hypothetical that nearly matched the facts of Tahoe-Sierra
itself, for a time-limited building moratorium." As Michelman correctly predicted,
the Court there "regard[ed] [the] case as presenting a new and unresolved question."4 5
I could go on with many more examples of Michelman's prescient and illuminating readings of cases and rules of decision in takings jurisprudence, but time is limited
and I think my point is apparent by now. Let me close with a radical thought: rereading
Michelman's analyses of takings doctrine in these and other articles made me think that
there is a lot more coherence in takings law than conventional wisdom acknowledges.
Those who repeat the conventional wisdom that there is no logic or order in takings
need to spend some more time reading Michelman, the master doctrinalist.

0 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
4" Michelman, Takings, supra note 4, at 1616-17.
42 Id. at 1617-19.
4' Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
44 Michelman, Takings, supra note 4, at 1621.
41 Id.; accord Tahoe-SierraPres. Council, 535 U.S. at 320-21.

